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Part I of this memorandum will discuss chapter 11 case law that supports the general 
principle that the property element of section 109(a) may be satisfied by any property of 
any amount belonging to the Debtor in the United States. Part II focuses on chapter 15 cases 
where courts stated that retainers, causes of action and contract rights are sufficient property for 
debtor eligibility under section 109(a).  
I. In Chapter 11 Cases, Section 109 May be Satisfied by Tangible and Intangible
Property of the Debtor of Any Amount in the United States.
Courts have repeatedly held that, given the lack of specificity, section 109 is satisfied by 
any property, of any value, of the debtor in the United States.3 The court in In re Global Ocean 
Carriers concluded that, in light of the small amount of money in the debtor’s account, it was the 
party’s bank accounts in the United States—not the amount of money deposited therein—that 
made debtor’s property sufficient.4 Moreover, using the court’s reasoning in In re McTague, the 
court posited that in light of its clarity, section 109(a) does not afford the court any discretion “to 
look behind the language and declare that the quantity of property in the United States will be 
decisive of [debtor] eligibility.”5  
Courts will recognize debtor eligibility to commence a bankruptcy case in the United States 
even when the debtor owns intangible property, such as bank accounts, clearing accounts, and 
3 See In re Glob. Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (positing that under the plain meaning 
of section 109(a), any amount of property, whether “a dollar, a dime or a peppercorn located in the United States,” is 
sufficient for debtor eligibility) (quoting In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
4 Id. at 38. 
5 Id. at 39 (quoting In re McTague, 198 B.R. at 432). 
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stocks in the United States.6 However, a line is drawn where claims are too remote or “inchoate,” 
such as claims against property in the United States without an actual property interest.7 
For property to suffice under section 109(a), it must be in the debtor’s possession at the 
time the bankruptcy petition is filed. For instance, the court in In re Yukos Oil Company, found 
that funds transferred to an entity created by the debtor just hours before filing for bankruptcy met 
the requirements of section 109(a).8 
A majority of courts hold that under section 541(a) of the Code, prepetition retainers 
constitute property of the estate.9 Viewing prepetition retainers property of the estate, courts have 
held that retainers constitute sufficient property for debtor eligibility under section 109.10 Even 
retainers funded by non-debtor third parties also constitute property under section 109 as courts 
deem irrelevant who pays the retainer, so long as the debtor holds an interest in the retainer.11 
6 See, e.g., In re Cenargo Int’l, PLC, 294 B.R. 571, 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that debtor eligibility was 
undisputed because debtor had property in United States in form of joint bank accounts and stock pledged to secure 
high yielding notes); accord Bank of Am. v. World of English, N.V., 23 B.R. 1015, 1019-23 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (finding 
petitioners’ bank accounts in California property within the meaning of section 109(a)). 
7 In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 651–52  (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that debtors’ claims to remainder of trust 
fund in the event of a surplus was “too tenuous, too inchoate, and too contrived”). 
8 321 B.R. 396, 411 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); see also In re Glob. Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. at 37 (determining 
that having boats in U.S. ports 143 days each year did not qualify as property in the United States because the boats 
were not in the U.S. ports on the day the petition was filed). 
9 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶328.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2018), available at 
LEXIS, 3-328 Collier on Bankruptcy P 328.02. 
10 See, e.g., In re Glob. Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. at 39 (holding that retainers paid on behalf of the debtors were 
sufficient property to meet the criteria of section 109). 
11 See Miller v. United States Trustee (In re Indep. Eng’g Co.), 232 B.R. 529, 533 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999) (finding 
retainer funded by a third party on behalf of debtor property of the estate as debtor retained an interest in the 
unapplied security retainer); see also In re Crimson Inv., N.V., 109 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (stating 
“[i]f Debtor’s Counsel and the party supplying the funds to the debtor fail to disclose the source of those funds, then 
the interest in the trust funds devolves to the Debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7)”). 
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II. In Chapter 15 Cases, Courts Have Found that Retainers, Causes of Action and
Contract Rights Suffice as Property Under Section 109
 Courts in chapter 15 cases recognize retainers as sufficient property for debtor 
eligibility under section 109(a).12 For example, in reviewing de novo whether an attorney retainer 
is sufficient basis for debtor eligibility, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California found that section 109 did not set parameters on the amount of property.13 As a 
result, the court held that retainers also satisfy the threshold for debtor eligibility, following the 
decisions of the district courts bound by In re Barnet.14 In support of a broad application of 
section 109, the court in In re Octaviar posited that an imposition of a requisite amount of 
property under section 109 would “subvert the intent of Congress” and undermine certain 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.15 In addition, several circuit courts have held that 
causes of action, though intangible, constitute property.16  
 In a chapter 15 case, the court in In re Octaviar found that the debtor had property in the 
United States by applying the well-established principle that property of the estate may include 
12 See, e.g., In re Avanti Commc’n Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603, 613–14  (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that a retainer 
and a 2023 Indenture governed by New York satisfied the property requirement); In re U.S. Steel Can. Inc., 571 B.R. 
600, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding undrawn $100,000 retainer in New York bank account paid by foreign 
debtor to its United States counsel property of debtor in the United States); In re Cell C Proprietary Ltd., 571 B.R. 
542, 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding foreign debtor eligible under section 109(a) on the basis of retainer paid to 
international law firm representing debtor, deposited in New York bank account); In re Inversora Eléctrica de Buenos 
Aires S.A., 560 B.R. 650, 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding sufficient assets in the United States, among which 
included an attorney retainer deposited in New York). 
13 See Jones v. APR Energy Holdings Ltd. (In re Forge Grp. Power Pty Ltd.), 2018 WL 827913 at 36 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 12, 2018) (following the out of circuit bankruptcy courts, the court found that any amount, whether “a dollar, a 
dime or a peppercorn located in the United States” suffices) (quoting In re Glob. Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. at 
38-39).
14 Id. at 38.
15 In re Octaviar Admin. Pty Ltd., 511 B.R. 361, 373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2014) (stating that imposing a minimum
amount of property would be inconsistent with “other provisions of the Code that reject lengthy and contentious
examination of the grounds for a bankruptcy filing.”).
16 See, e.g., Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957, 963 (2d Cir. 1989) (positing that all interests, including intangible
property such as causes of action constitutes property); accord Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns,
P.A. v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that debtor’s legal malpractice
cause of action is property of his bankruptcy estate); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Swift (In re Swift), 129 F.3d 792,
802 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that debtor’s causes of action accrued before filing his bankruptcy petition, the court
held that the causes of action became the property of the bankruptcy estate).
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claims and causes of action commenced in the United States.17 Furthermore, as explained by the 
court in Octaviar, courts possess a level of discretion in determining the situs of a cause of action, 
as it is dependent on the “common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and 
convenience.”18  
 Courts have also recognized that a debtor’s contract rights, which in turn create property 
rights, are intangible property of the debtor, satisfying section 109(a) eligibility requirement.19 In 
In re Ocean Rig, the District Court for the Southern District of New York found that New York 
law governed the debtors’ debt, since the instruments governing the debt contained exclusive New 
York forum selection provisions.20 As a result, the court held that the foreign debtors satisfied 
section 109(a)’s requirement of having property in the United States.21  
Conclusion 
Courts have regularly held that the property component of section 109, in both chapter 11 
and chapter 15, is easily satisfied.  Property is not limited to a specific amount or form, but rather 
may be satisfied by: inter alia, retainers, causes of action, and contract rights that are located in 
the United States.   
17 In re Octaviar Admin. Pty Ltd., 511 B.R. at 369–70 . 
18 Id. at 372 (quoting In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 484 B.R. 615, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)); see also In re BCI Fin. 
Ltd., 583 B.R. 288, 302 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding that debtors’ fiduciary duty claims are located in New 
York under Australian law, basing their finding on several considerations, including those relating to enforcement). 
19 See In re Avanti Commc’n Group PLC, 582 B.R. at 613–14 (basing debtor eligibility under section 109 on, inter 
alia, 2023 Indenture governed by New York law); In re U.S. Steel Can. Inc., 571 B.R. 600, 609-611 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2017) (explaining that a debtor’s contract rights are property of the debtor and those rights are tied to the
location of the governing law of the contract); see also In re Bureau Cap. Res. PTE Ltd., 540 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that by virtue of the New York choice of law and forum selection clauses in debtor’s
indenture, the situs of debtor’s intangible property rights was New York).
20 In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 570 B.R. 687, 700 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017).
21 Id.
